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The aim of this essay is to elaborate philosophical and ethical underpinnings of posthumous diagnosis of famous
historical figures based on literary and artistic products, or commonly called retrospective diagnosis. It discusses
ontological and epistemic challenges raised in the humanities and social sciences, and attempts to systematically
reply to their criticisms from the viewpoint of clinical medicine, philosophy of medicine, particularly the ontology of
disease and the epistemology of diagnosis, and medical ethics. The ontological challenge focuses on the doubt
about the persistence of a disease over historical time, whereas the epistemic challenge disputes the inaccessibility
of scientific verification of a diagnosis in the past. I argue that the critics are in error in conflating the taxonomy of disease
(nosology) and the act of diagnosing a patient. Medical diagnosis is fundamentally a hypothesis-construction and an
explanatory device that can be generated under various degrees of uncertainty and limited amount of information. It is
not an apodictic judgment (true or false) as the critics presuppose, but a probabilistic (Bayesian) judgment with varying
degrees of plausibility under uncertainty. In order to avoid this confusion, I propose that retrospective diagnosis of a
historical figure be syndromic without identifying underlying disease, unless there is justifiable reason for such specification.
Moreover it should be evaluated not only from the viewpoint of medical science but also in a larger context of the
scholarship of the humanities and social sciences by its overall plausibility and consistency. On the other hand, I will
endorse their concerns regarding the ethics and professionalism of retrospective diagnosis, and call for the need for
situating such a diagnosis in an interdisciplinary scope and the context of the scholarship of the historical figure. I will
then enumerate several important caveats for interdisciplinary retrospective diagnosis using an example of the retrospective
diagnosis of Socrates for his life-long intermittent neurologic symptoms. Finally, I will situate the present argument in a
larger context of the major debate among the historians of medicine and paleopathologists, and discuss the similarities
and differences.
Keywords: Retrospective diagnosis, Philosophy of medicine, History of medicine, Medical ethics, Ontology of disease,
Epistemology in medicine, Pathography, Socrates, Plato, Frédéric ChopinIntroduction
Diagnosing medical conditions of a famous historical figure
based on evidence found in documents, arts, and other
artifacts is a small but popular genre of medical publishing
[1]. What is the diagnosis of the illness that tormented
Frédéric Chopin for so many years? What neurological
disease did Friedrich Nietzsche suffer from for many years
before he died? These are typical questions discussed occa-
sionally in medical journals. But this activity is not withoutCorrespondence: muramoto@ohsu.edu
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unless otherwise stated.criticisms. Some serious scholars in the humanities and
social sciences are not happy about this “fun escape of
doctors” [1-6]. First, these “hobbyist” historians are not
following the methodological disciplines of historiography,
literary criticism, and other relevant subject areas of the
humanities and social sciences. For example, they often
literally interpret the documents in translation without crit-
ically analyzing the primary source in the original language.
But more importantly, as these retrospective diagnoses
become more and more medically sophisticated as med-
ical knowledge advances, these critics are increasingly
skeptical about the authenticity of such highly specific andd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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ciency in Chopin [7], which became known only due to
the recent advancement in medical technology. These
reports often do not consider the possibility that different
diseases might have existed in historical time, or the same
disease might have been described through different
illness experiences that are bound by a particular historical
time and place. Hence the critics call them “anachronistic
diagnosis” [5,6]. This is an ontological challenge because it
questions the existence of a certain disease in historical
time. Another challenge is the impossibility of verifying or
falsifying the medical hypothesis of retrospective diagnosis
for obvious reasons—we cannot examine and test the
historical subject. This is an epistemic challenge because it
questions the access to historical knowledge. And finally,
another important challenge pertains to the ethics and
professionalism of those clinicians who render retrospect-
ive diagnoses. They publish a diagnosis of a patient with
whom they never had a physician-patient relationship,
and without any consent. There is such a stark contrast to
the diagnosis of their contemporary patients, which is
strictly regulated and sanctioned by their professionalism
and medical ethics. Even if medical affairs of public figures
in historical times are outside the boundaries of medical
ethics and professionalism, the question remains what
goals such retrospective diagnoses serve. It is often
unclear how such a highly specific diagnosis would make
any difference in the scholarship of the historical person
in question. Without such a discussion these new diagnos-
tic labels are seen by the critics as just a hobby of those
physicians who want to exercise their diagnostic acumen
for fun. One critic goes so far as to advise journal editors
to reject those papers for publication ([3], p144, also see
endnotea for a qualification of this criticism). This essay
intends to systematically reply to these critics from the
viewpoint of clinical medicine, philosophy of medicine,
and medical ethics.
Before going into further discussion, however, let me
first clarify the concept and terminology of “retrospective
diagnosis”. This term has been used at least in four differ-
ent ways, as shown in the Table 1. First, in clinical medi-
cine, it is a generic term for any diagnosis that is made
retrospectively, usually based on new information that was
not available in an earlier diagnosis. Postmortem diagnosisTable 1 Different meanings and concepts of “retrospective di
Category of investigation Meaning and concept
Retrospective Diagnosis in
Clinical Medicine
Diagnosis that is made by hindsig
tests, and forensic examination
Retrospective Diagnosis in Psychiatry Pathography, or a psychiatric diag
Retrospective Diagnosis of a Famous
Historical Figure
Diagnosis of a deceased famous
Retrospective Diagnosis of Historical
Diseases
Scientific identification of historicbased on autopsy is a prototypical retrospective diagnosis.
For clinicians, a retrospective diagnosis of a recently
deceased patient is routine and uncontroversial, and post-
mortem diagnosis based on textual evidence might be
considered an extension of this practice. In psychiatry, the
retrospective diagnosis of mental disorders using phenom-
enological and psychopathological analysis of written texts
has been a branch of study called pathography (Pathogra-
phie) [8], which was first introduced by such German
neuropsychiatrists as Julius Möbius, Ernst Kretschmer,
and Karl Jaspers over a century ago [9]. This methodology
is also well established and uncontroversial. But only
recently, is the term “pathography” also used in a totally
different meaning of illness narratives, particularly in the
medical humanities [10]. While the diagnostic pathog-
raphy has a longer tradition and established usage, the
term “retrospective diagnosis” is preferred in recent litera-
ture in order to avoid confusion with the illness narrative.
Medical diagnosis of historical figures based on textual
evidence and other artifacts is the third category of retro-
spective diagnosis, which is the very subject of this essay.
The fourth category of the usage of the term “retrospective
diagnosis” is in the field of the history of medicine and
paleopathology. The main interest of their investigation is
to identify a disease that was experienced and described by
the population in a historical time and place, and often di-
agnosed by medical professionals of that time. While the
term “diagnosis” is used, the main endeavor of these
medical historians and paleopathologists is the scientific
identification of a historical disease, not so much of diag-
nosing a particular individual patient by analyzing a
complex life-long history of illness. The meanings and
concepts of all these four categories of retrospective
diagnosis are related to each other with many overlaps,
but there are also important differences which I will
discuss later.
In what follows, I will first analyze the criticisms of the
retrospective diagnosis of famous historical figures in
the realms of ontology, epistemology, and ethics/profes-
sionalism, and provide my own replies. I will show that
the critics’ skepticism of retrospective diagnosis regard-
ing the ontological persistence of disease entities and the
epistemic non-verification through diagnostic testing
originates in the erroneous conflation of the taxonomyagnosis”
ht, such as after the knowledge of postmortem examination, laboratory
nosis made from written products
historical figure based on biography and other documents and artifacts
al diseases based on archeological material, documents and artifacts
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other hand, I will endorse and further develop their criti-
cisms regarding the ethics and professionalism of retrospect-
ive diagnosis, particularly the need for clear interdisciplinary
scope and goals. Next, I will demonstrate these points using
an example of the retrospective diagnosis of Socrates for his
life-long intermittent neurologic symptoms. Finally, I will re-
view the relevance of this current proposal with the ongoing
discussion among the medical historians and paleopatholo-
gists. In this section, I will show important similarities and
differences between the retrospective disease identification
of historical diseases, and the retrospective diagnosis of a
historical person.
Ontological challenges of retrospective diagnosis
While most historians and paleopathologists seem to
agree that human anatomy and physiology have not chan-
ged or evolved to a significant degree of their interest
during the past several thousand years of human history,
there has been a tremendous change in human environ-
ment, including sanitation, natural climate, and the evolu-
tion of other organisms such as microbes and parasites.
Leven ([5], p376) introduces the concept of “pathomor-
phosis” to capture this problem. Based on this concern, he
concludes:
The entity tuberculosis itself, like nearly all other
disease entities, has achieved the rank of a natural
species … What then should prevent us from
identifying the present disease entity tuberculosis in
descriptions of the past? The intention of this article
has been to show that history and its rules should
prevent us from such an approach ([5], p383).
Behind this conundrum of identifying the present
tuberculosis and the past descriptions of diseases with
similar manifestations, there are two kinds of philosoph-
ical questions: one is whether Disease X which we
recognize as tuberculosis today is the same and identical
disease as “phthisis”, “consumption”, or whatever they
called in historical time. In this conception, Disease X is
one and identical (caused by the same Mycobacterium
tuberculosis infection) but it is argued that “tuberculosis”
and “phthisis” are different because they are conceptual-
ized in a different context with different linguistic, social
and cultural meanings. Even if we are dealing with the
identical Disease X, biological responses are also differ-
ent among historical patients due to differences in the
immune system and other host factors. Recognition of
Disease X by physicians is also different in different
historical times due to differences in diagnostic concep-
tions and technologies. For all these reasons, the critics
argue, it is impossible to make a retrospective diagnosis
of tuberculosis. This is, however, not a question of theontology of Disease X because its existence and persist-
ence over historical time is not questioned. What pre-
vents retrospective diagnosis is the differences in human
experience, including naming and knowledge, of Disease
X. Because this is a form of epistemic argument, I will
come back to this question in the next section.
The other way to analyze this conundrum is to consider
modern tuberculosis representing Disease X, while histor-
ical tuberculosis representing Disease X′. Diseases X and
X′ may be related to each other, but they are not identical,
or may be clinically similar but may be different entities
with different etiology and pathophysiology. If we use the
above example, historical phthisis most likely included
miscellaneous conditions clinically similar to tuberculosis
[11]. Contemporary tuberculosis (Disease X) is caused by
Mycobacterium tuberculosis whereas the historical tuber-
culosis (Disease X′) might have included the conditions
caused by Mycobacterium bovis [12]. In this conception,
the underlying diseases themselves are different on top of
the historical changes in human experience including the
biological responses and classification. This is an onto-
logical question because it questions the persistence of a
disease entity itself over time. Many infectious agents are
known to evolve in a relatively short period of time (e.g.
influenza viruses) and clinical diseases caused by these
agents emerge and ebb over time. The ontological and
epistemic questions are, however, closely related to each
other because, in order to know exactly what Disease X′
was, we still need to know how historical people experi-
enced Disease X′ from historical records. We then face
the challenge of the accessibility and verifiability of our
historical knowledge of Disease X′. It seems that the
epistemic question is pivotal to the ontological questions.
One way to address the persistence of disease entities
over historical time is to empirically investigate historical
diseases through modern scientific techniques. This is
an important area of study in paleopathology. For
example, if we can test the remains of past patients, such
as bones, teeth, and mummies, we might make a reason-
able confirmation that the same disease existed in the
past. It seems uncontroversial that the same or closely
similar skeletal pathologies and skeletal diseases such as
Paget's disease of bone existed in the historical past
([13], pp697-8). Moreover, by extracting ancient DNA
from human remains, paleopathologists can provide
valuable information regarding the speciation and the
identification of the strains of infectious agents. (See
Roberts [12] for biomolecular identification of Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis and Haensch et al. [14] for Yersinia
pestis, the agent for the Black Death, from archeological
remains.) While the ontological challenge to retrospect-
ive diagnosis may seem to be answered by empirical
studies, paleopathologists are still faced with the onerous
challenge of epistemology. For example, it is emphasized
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from modern clinical medicine ([13], pp697-8). Yet
paleopathologists themselves are struggling with the
challenges of understanding historical diseases within
their historical context [15]. In other words, there seems
no way to discuss Disease X and X′ other than by ana-
lyzing them and describing them in today's methodology
and terminology in order to put them into our contem-
porary discourse. If so, the epistemic problem of histori-
cizing diseases can be a hurdle against any effort to
settle the ontological problem. Nevertheless, I agree with
the critics to the extent that it is important, whenever
we discuss retrospective diagnosis, to address the ques-
tion whether Disease X and Disease X′ are identical or
different, and if different, whether the difference is onto-
logical (difference in disease itself ) or epistemic (differ-
ence in human experience of the same disease). Often
times, we have no definitive answer, but I argue that the
absence of evidence for the persistence of a disease is
not the evidence for the absence. There is often circum-
stantial evidence that Disease X and X′ are very close, if
not identical, given the approximate continuity of hu-
man anatomy, physiology, and chemistry over historical
time. We should not dismiss retrospective diagnosis
altogether just because we are unable to ascertain that
Disease X and X′ are identical, as Leven argues.
A similar but somewhat different concern is expressed
by Karenberg [3]. He argues that medical knowledge and
nosology change over time, and gives an example of
Frédéric Chopin’s diagnoses since 1899. This includes
five medical diagnoses related to his respiratory problem,
from tuberculosis to cystic fibrosis to alpha-1 antitrypsin
deficiency, and five psychiatric diagnoses related to his
mental symptoms, from “psychasthenia” to bipolar dis-
order. Karenberg wrote that these diagnoses represent a
“perfect self-referential system” within medicine, and
“little appreciated by outsiders, … historians of music or
biographers.” “[T]he emerging concepts of disease and
medical diagnoses proposed [for Chopin’s case] over the
last 120 years strongly correspond with research on
these diseases in clinical medicine ([3], pp142-3)”. For
historians, it is perplexing that the medical condition
that a historical figure had, which is supposed to be fixed
as a historical reality forever, changes so frequently in
correlation with the progress of modern medicine. “How
come Chopin can have such a state-of-the-art modern
disease which was not known in his time?” is the typical
reaction. Leven also echoes Karenberg by saying that it
is “a symptom of an anachronistic self-image of medi-
cine” ([5], p384). As a new conception of disease and
diagnosis is introduced, clinicians are tempted to apply
such a new label to a historical figure. But to historians,
it does not make sense at all to put new labels to a his-
torical event without any new historical evidence.Behind this challenge is the critics’ doctrine that
historical facts in general, and historical diseases in
particular, must be interpreted in their historical context,
or historicism. Retrospective diagnosis is anachronistic
exactly because it tries to diagnose a disease of the past
in contemporary terms. This challenge is also complex
because there are two prongs. One is whether a histor-
ical fact, in this example the fact that Chopin had
Disease X, is independent from the historian who
describes it, and the other is whether a medical diagno-
sis, in this example the diagnosis of Disease X in the pa-
tient Chopin, whether it is in contemporary or historical
time, is independent from diagnosticians. It seems that
the critics’ challenges are based on the assumption that
it is an observer-independent fact that a certain disease
existed in a historical person whether any historian can
know and describe it or any medical professional can
diagnose it. That is the historical reality that is independ-
ent of observers. Were they to accept observer-dependent
historical reality, they would have had no qualms about
the ever-changing nature of Chopin’s diagnosis over the
past 120 years, because the description of his disease and
diagnosis would have been all observer-dependent, always
analyzed and described from the observer's viewpoint of
his time, and necessarily changed over time. We might call
their position ontological realism about historical facts in
general, and the persistence of diseases and medical diag-
noses more specifically. (For the comparison of realism
and antirealism about historical facts, see Murphy [16],
and about medical diagnosis, see Simon [17]). But antire-
alists have a ready reply to those realists: how do they
know that there are observer-independent historical facts
and diagnoses? If they assume that Chopin’s disease is one
and fixed forever, how do they know and confirm that
alleged fact? Once we start analyzing Chopin’s disease
using modern methodology and the language of historiog-
raphy, paleopathology, and modern diagnostics, the result
is of course observer-dependent—dependent on us mod-
ern historians and diagnosticians—and thus it is com-
pletely anachronistic. How could they possibly prove their
alleged historical reality in a non-anachronistic way that is
independent from our current “anachronistic” methods?
Is there an a-historical vantage point (“God’s eye view”) to
view diseases of different historical times? As we analyze
the critics’ ontological challenges against retrospective
diagnosis, it becomes clear that they are intricately
entangled with the epistemic challenges, to which I will
turn in the next section.
Epistemic challenges of retrospective diagnosis
Assuming that a historical figure did have a real disease
in the past, how do we know what disease he had? This
is the central question of retrospective diagnosis. There
seem to be two competing views. First, one believes not
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historical person, but also that we should be able to
know that reality in a non-anachronistic way if we were
provided with an ideal access to that reality. However,
we are not able to know it exactly because we have no
adequate access to the historical reality. Texts and arti-
facts are not preserved as medical data, and they should
not serve as a means to access the medical reality of the
past ([5], p375). The second thought is that one also
accepts the existence of the medical reality of the histor-
ical figure in the past, but believes that the only thing we
can say about this reality is to construct or reconstruct it
in our discourse through our own perception using pres-
ently available information, particularly texts and arti-
facts, along with state-of-the-art medical knowledge.
While he may believe it is the best approximation of the
historical reality, he readily admits that there is no guar-
antee that such a construction exactly matches the
historical reality. Let me call the first argument realist
about retrospective diagnosis, and the second antirealist
or constructivist about retrospective diagnosis. In what
follows, I will reject the former, and defend the latter.
The realists are pessimistic about the possibility of
retrospective diagnosis of historical figures. They have to
remain agnostic about such a diagnosis. Thus Leven
wrote ([5], p373, emphasis added): “Is it possible then to
identify these past diseases with our present diseases?
This … question cannot be answered with ‘yes’, rather, it
cannot be answered at all …”. Let me call this argument
skeptical agnosticism.
Karenberg also presents a variant of Leven's argument
to cast the same doubt about the epistemic access to
retrospective diagnosis:
As a final proof (such as a pathoanatomical finding, a
lab test or a genetic analysis) usually cannot be
provided, it is impossible to falsify or verify a
hypothesis of this kind – the “cases” of Alexander the
Great, Mozart and van Gogh are excellent examples
for this situation. As a matter of fact, a “may-be”-
diagnosis concerning a historical patient never can be
ascertained in the same way as a modern patient
([3], p142).
Let me call this the verificationist argument, which is a
classical doctrine of logical positivism (empiricism) which
says that a proposition can be said to be true only if it
could conceivably be shown to be false, if false ([18], p60).
What is common between the above skeptical agnosti-
cism and the verificationist argument is the positivist view
of medical diagnosis, which takes it as something to be
“identified” and “verified”. As Karenberg states, medical
diagnosis is equated with laboratory tests and genetic tests
and these tests are considered the “final proof”. Sincethese tests give a positive-or-negative answer most of the
time, medical diagnosis also becomes a binary yes-or-no,
or true-or-false question. Disease entities are something
that you have or you do not have. (The verificationist
argument does not necessarily entail a binary judgment,
and I am merely asserting that the critics are using these
together.) Leven also states ([5], p383), “Disease entities
for modern scientific medicine seem to be biological
entities.” And this view is not limited to the critics of
retrospective diagnosis; most people exposed to current
technological medicine perceive medical diagnosis as a
binary judgment of having or not having a disease. But I
submit that this view is only a contemporary brainchild of
modern biomedical sciences.
Diagnostic categories are a man-made construction,
and not the product of nature itself or “biological en-
tities” as Leven asserts (See Wilson [19]). As Cunningham
[20] states, a disease or a disease concept does not exist
independent from the act of diagnosing. He expresses
this fact in a simple phrase: “you die of what your doctor
says you die of”. A diagnosis that is independent of a
diagnostician does not exist even if there may be ana-
tomical, physiological, and chemical changes that are
consistent with a disease in a patient. Only after a diag-
nostician diagnoses a patient by assigning her into a
diagnostic category do we say that the disease exists in
the patient. Take a simple example of hypertension to
illustrate this point. Blood pressure reading is a continu-
ous spectrum from low to high numbers, and the num-
bers themselves do not represent a disease or normalcy.
It is a man-made cut-off point above which is the value
for disease or positive and below which is normal or
negative that determines the diagnosis of hypertension.
Most laboratory tests have a similar man-made cut-off
point to differentiate positive or negative. Even patho-
logical and genetic tests have grey zones and human
judgment is final to categorize these cases as disease or
no disease. But as we become used to these diagnostic
categories, we tend to believe that a diagnostic category
or nosology itself, such as hypertension or coronary artery
disease, is some sort of natural kind that belongs to nature
itself independent from human construction. But as any
medical practitioner knows, it is a man-made construction
which is constantly revised and reconstructed. Good
examples of constantly revised diagnostic categories are
ICD (International Classification of Diseases) code and
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM).
In the premodern era up to the 19th century, diagnoses
that patients received were only about symptoms, and
there was no concept of differential diagnosis which
includes identifying disease A against B or no disease, or
verifying against diagnostic standards. The preoccupation
of a medical practitioner was to offer various therapies
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that the critics of retrospective diagnosis who demand his-
toricized diagnoses of a historical figure also demand non-
historicist identification and verification in modern terms,
which seems to be self-contradictory and anachronistic.
But a more fundamental question is whether an act of
medical diagnosis is all about identifying, verifying, and cat-
egorizing underlying diseases of the patient. In fact, med-
ical diagnosis has many important aspects, among which
identification and verification are only one of these. In the
rest of this section, I will enumerate at least five aspects of
medical diagnosis that are important and relevant to retro-
spective diagnosis. First of all, medical diagnosis is a
process of hypothesis-making and hypothesis-adjustment.
Medical diagnosis is not just a “truth-finding” expedition
into the reality of the sick body and mind of the patient, as
natural scientists discover a hidden truth of nature. Nor is
it just a classification of the patient’s condition into a
known taxonomy, as a botanist examines and classifies a
newly discovered plant. Medical diagnosis is a dynamic
guide for clinical decision-making with constant iteration
between hypothesis-making and hypothesis-evaluation and
adjustment according to the clinical reality that changes
continuously and rapidly [23]. Because the clinician makes
decisions under uncertainty, he has to adjust the diagnostic
hypothesis on the fly according to what happens next. And
this is one of the reasons why the same patient with the
same condition can receive many different diagnoses with
different focuses and specificity. Each of these is a valid
and important diagnosis at each step of medical care, and
gives a different level of guidance to the next step.
The second important aspect of clinical diagnosis is that
it is fundamentally a probabilistic judgment (something
is more likely or less likely) under uncertainty rather than
an apodictic judgment (something is true or false) under
certainty, as the critics understand. And the iteration
of hypothesis-making and hypothesis-adjustment follows
Bayesian probabilistic reasoning [18,24]. In the most sim-
plified form, Bayesian reasoning is expressed as: (Poster-
ior Probability) = (Prior Probability) × (Likelihood Ratio),
where Posterior Probability is the probability of correct
diagnosis after the diagnostic evaluation (hereafter “Post-
odds”) and Prior Probability is the probability of correct
diagnosis before the diagnostic evaluation (hereafter “Pre-
odds”). Likelihood Ratio is the ratio of the true-positive
rate divided by the false-positive rate of the evaluation.
When the Post-odds increases from the Pre-odds, that
means that the probability of the hypothesis being correct
increases (or the diagnosis becomes more plausible), and
thus the diagnostic evaluation is correct, that is to say the
true-positive rate is greater than the false-positive rate.
When the Post-odds decreases, the plausibility decreases
and the hypothesis is deemed less likely. The clinician
must go back to the previous stage to adjust the initialhypothesis or select a different method of evaluation. By
iterating this process of hypothesis-making, -evaluation,
and -adjustment according to Bayesian reasoning, the
diagnosis can achieve a higher probability of certainty.
The third aspect is that the degree of certainty of a
diagnosis need not be 100%. There is no such thing as a
100% certain diagnosis, but more importantly clinicians
often are satisfied with an uncertain diagnosis depending
on the clinical need and context. Such a diagnosis is still
“correct” and fully useful in clinical reality. For example,
when a physician sees a patient with upper respiratory
symptoms and makes a diagnosis of “viral syndrome”, he
will not embark on any “truth-finding” expedition to
confirm this diagnosis and find out the exact virus that
is causing the patient's symptoms. It is a syndromic diag-
nosis without etiological confirmation. He is merely
assigning the patient to a large undifferentiated diagnos-
tic group of miscellaneous viral infections which are
self-limited. This is because identification and verifica-
tion have no use for clinical management, and he knows
that the patients with “viral syndrome” recover spontan-
eously only by symptomatic treatment. On the other
hand, if there is an outbreak of a certain viral infection
which needs to be contained, he would probably do a
test to determine the exact virus, such as SARS or
H1N1. This example shows that a clinical diagnosis and
a diagnostic category to be employed are dictated by the
need and the context of the patient, place, and time. As
Edmond Murphy stated, “A major function of diagnosis
is precisely to discern where and where not to look in
detail”. ([18], p7) It is not that one diagnosis is “true”
and the others are “false”.
The fourth aspect of medical diagnosis that is relevant
to the current discussion is that the act of diagnosing is
a social practice, and medical diagnosis is an explanatory
device with many social implications [25]. A clinician is
not a natural scientist whose task is to uncover a hidden
state of affairs of nature; she is only applying natural sci-
ences to more pragmatic tasks of caring and treating a
sick patient, explaining the condition, and prognosticat-
ing the future course of his suffering. When an ancient
physician “diagnosed” a patient with epilepsy as “sacred
disease”, it was an explanatory device to advise the
patient regarding what to do and what to expect [26]. In
the same way, when a modern neurologist diagnoses a
patient with epilepsy as “mesial temporal lobe epilepsy
with hippocampal sclerosis”, it is also an explanatory
device to advise the patient for specific treatment and
prognosis that are attached to this specific diagnostic
category. It is the best construction of the state of affairs
at the moment of the advancement of medical know-
ledge but it does not represent the entire reality of the
patient. That is why medical diagnosis as a construction
of concepts has changed and will change any time in the
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syndromic diagnoses of functional disorders (e.g. fibro-
myalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome) and many psychiatric
disorders. Despite the lack of any confirmatory test,
these syndromic diagnoses are a highly useful construc-
tion of the state of affairs of the patient. Syndrome
(meaning “running together” in Greek) is “the aggregate
of signs and symptoms associated with any morbid
process, and constituting together the picture of the
disease.” (Steadman’s Medical Dictionary, emphasis added).
Syndromes do not have identifiable or verifiable under-
lying biological entities, yet they are a very useful ex-
planatory device and used more and more. And most
importantly for the discussion of retrospective diagno-
sis, syndromic diagnosis can be made from history alone
and is highly successful. In one frequently cited study
[28] clinicians could reach the correct diagnosis more
than 80% of the time by clinical history alone without
examining the patient or obtaining laboratory tests.
These diagnoses were mostly syndromic. The remaining
20% of the cases ended up with different diagnoses after
examination and/or laboratory tests. But the lesson we
learn from this study is that even for those diseases that
have known underlying biological entity can still be di-
agnosed by syndromic diagnosis 80% of the time. And this
is a very decent odds for a judgment under uncertainty. If
a clinician is provided with the history of the patient's en-
tire life with many witness accounts of symptoms in a
form of biography and other historical documents, is it
not unreasonable to expect the accuracy of such a syn-
dromic diagnosis even better?
The last but not the least relevant point is that medical
diagnosis has several methodological dimensions. One
condition can be diagnosed from many different dimen-
sions: by clinical signs and symptoms (clinical diagnosis);
by laboratory tests (laboratory diagnosis); by genetic tests
(genetic diagnosis); by identifying etiology (etiological
diagnosis); by pathological examination (pathological diag-
nosis). These methodological dimensions are not syn-
onymous labels for the same condition. For example, AIDS
(clinical diagnosis) and HIV infection (etiologic diagnosis)
are not synonymous; a patient can have the latter without
former. Which methodological dimension to be used
depends on the clinical context. As already mentioned, the
diagnosis of “viral syndrome” (clinical diagnosis) is suffi-
cient without etiological or laboratory diagnosis in certain
clinical contexts. In fact, numerous syndromic diagnoses
without identifiable underlying biological facts are being
used in contemporary clinical medicine. When a clinician
makes a retrospective diagnosis of a historical figure based
on his works (texts and arts) and the records of behavior
(biography), it is impossible to make a laboratory, patho-
logical, or genetic diagnosis since none of these tests are
available unless we also have access to some material thatcan be analyzed by the methods of paleopathology. And
since etiological diagnoses almost invariably rely on tests,
these are also impossible. That means that retrospective
diagnosis makes sense only if it is a clinical diagnosis. For
example, the retrospective diagnosis of “alpha-1 antitrypsin
deficiency” for Chopin does not make sense because this
requires a laboratory test to measure a serum alpha-1 anti-
trypsin level, which is not available for Chopin. One could
still say Chopin had a clinical syndrome consistent with or
similar to alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency. Whether such a
clinical diagnosis makes sense is debatable, however, given
the fact that this condition is clinically very difficult to dis-
tinguish from more common and prevalent emphysema or
COPD. Because of this inherent methodological limitation
of making a retrospective diagnosis beyond clinical and
syndromic diagnosis, I suggest that retrospective diagnosis
be limited to these methodological dimensions.
To sum up, medical diagnosis has many different as-
pects and dimensions and need not be “identifying” and
“verifying” an underlying biological reality. Skeptical ag-
nosticism and verificationism are based on the erroneous
conflation of taxonomizing the imagined natural kinds
of diseases with the multifaceted social act of diagnosing
a patient. When the critics realize that the taxonomy of
diseases against which diagnoses are “identified” and
“verified” is nothing more than a dynamic man-made
construction of a given historical time, they lose support
of their concept of the observer-independent medical
and historical reality.
Retrospective diagnosis as theory construction
So far, I have argued that it is a misguided demand on
the part of the critics of retrospective diagnosis to expect
any medical diagnosis to be “identifying” and “verifying”
a disease in a patient. However, the critics would object
to this argument as follows: retrospective diagnosis is
not for a patient whom the clinician is seeing in his
clinic or hospital. The patient about whom the diagnosis
is rendered is a dead historical person whom the clin-
ician never saw. Therefore, many arguments from the
logic of clinical diagnosis as discussed in the previous
section do not apply to retrospective diagnosis. For
example, there is simply no possibility of hypothesis-
modification in the diagnostic process of a historical
patient, since no new clinical information is available,
except for a rare occasion of newly discovered historical
documents or artifacts. And above all, the critics would
contend that as long as a retrospective diagnosis is
presented as evidence for some larger proposition in the
humanities and social sciences, it is necessary that such
a diagnosis come with acceptable proof or verification,
which is unavailable.
I acknowledge that this is indeed a very serious problem,
and as long as we treat retrospective diagnosis, or any
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proposition, it would be very difficult to put it on the table
of any scholarly discourse. (This is a common conundrum
of epidemiologists who have to rely on the accuracy of
clinician's diagnoses for disease identification). Neverthe-
less, I would like to offer a new perspective to accom-
modate retrospective diagnosis in a broader scholarly
discourse of the humanities and social sciences as well as
medicine. As I discussed earlier, modern medical diagnosis
pretty much follows Bayesian reasoning under uncer-
tainty. I suggest that we expand this process to a larger
scope of retrospective diagnosis. Under the conception of
the Bayesian model of probabilistic judgment, unverifiable
retrospective diagnosis can be evaluated for its plausibility
and coherence in a larger context. This is also nothing
new in present-day medical practice; when clinicians do
not have any definitive evidence to follow in order to
make a clinical decision, they still follow peer reviews and
expert opinions. In order to do this, they regularly present
difficult cases in clinical conferences, and see if their diag-
nosis is supported by the peers. Or sometimes, the case is
presented to nationally known experts of the disease in
question and their agreement can serve as the support. It
is an old-fashioned way to “confirm” a diagnosis when
there is no evidence to rely on, but it is still one form of
Bayesian decision-making because the change of plausibil-
ity from Pre-odds to Post-odds by increasing or decreasing
the Likelihood Ratio is considered a confirmation or
disconfirmation of the diagnosis. I suggest that retrospect-
ive diagnosis be evaluated in similar peer-review methods.
Currently peer review medical journals seem to do this
job in terms of the soundness of diagnostic reasoning.
Unfortunately, however, the review does not seem as
rigorous as for contemporary case reports, as retrospective
diagnoses are viewed as of minor importance, which the
harsh criticisms of the critics will only aggravate.
While this peer review process may serve as a process of
confirmation about the medical aspect of retrospective
diagnosis, it is also important to address the critics’
concern that such medical discussions do not contribute to
the scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that there is a com-
monality between medical diagnosis and historiographic
theories: both are hypotheses that are confirmed or discon-
firmed by evidence using probabilistic, not apodictic,
judgment. In other words, both medical diagnosis and his-
toriographic reasoning involve the iteration of hypothesis-
making and hypothesis-adjustment according to the
evidence available. Day and Radick [29] propose two
models, the Bayesian and “explationist” (this term is ori-
ginal to Day and Radick) models, to capture this aspect of
historiographic reasoning. Let us use a hypothetical case to
demonstrate how these models work to confirm or discon-
firm hypotheses of retrospective diagnosis and art history.Suppose a hypothetical legendary painter in his 50’s
started painting pictures with the left side of the canvas
being less detailed and more abstract. No medical record
was available for this historical artist. Art historians
thought that this peculiar change in his painting style
was due to his artistic maturation and a shift toward
more abstract style and technique. Then a clinician pre-
sented a hypothesis that this change was due to brain
damage in his right hemisphere. (Similar cases are
reported by Bäzner and Hennerici [30]). What was the
evidence? Suppose the clinician can produce paintings
painted by other painters who were known to have right
hemispheric brain damage, and their paintings were very
similar to the ones painted by the legendary painter in
terms of neglecting the details on the left side of the pic-
tures. Or the clinician can cite the diary of the painter's
wife who witnessed that the painter somehow did not
pay attention to the left side of the tray when he was
eating—a telltale sign of left hemineglect, which is a sign
of right hemispheric damage. How do we evaluate this
new hypothesis based on a retrospective diagnosis?
Under the Bayesian model, the question is whether this
evidence makes the brain-damage theory more plausible
than the style-change theory. Under the “explationist”
model, the question is which hypothesis explains the
change in his paintings better. The answer comes from
further evaluation of the existing and additional evidence
that the art historians can produce to support their
style-change theory, and further debates will lead to
more hypothesis-making and hypothesis-modification.
The point I would like to make from this hypothetical
case is that a retrospective diagnosis should be evaluated
as a theory which competes with other non-medical the-
ories in a larger context of the humanities and social
sciences. As usual with many theories in these fields, it
is pointless to expect that such a theory would render an
apodictic judgment of true-or-false; most of the time,
they are a probabilistic judgment evaluated on a more-
or-less plausible or better-or-worse explainable basis, or
coherence with other evidence. And in order for such a
case report to be incorporated inside a broader context
of scholarly discussion, it is important to state what the-
ory and what question a particular case of retrospective
diagnosis would address.
Problems of ethics and professionalism in
retrospective diagnosis
It is interesting to note that the act of clinical diagnosis
is under the intense scrutiny of medical ethics and
professionalism, yet as far as making a diagnosis of a
historical figure, there seems to be no such concern. Is
there any problem with ethics and professionalism in
retrospective diagnosis? In the absence of a clinician-
patient relationship, usual principles of clinical ethics do
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lieve that anything goes. It is important to consider, first of
all, why the retrospective diagnosis is made, and what is
the impact that it can make on the scholarship and to our
society. The recently debated proposal to exhume Chopin’s
heart to make a genetic diagnosis of cystic fibrosis is a
prime example of ethical concern [31]. Genetic testing of
paleopathological material in general carries moral risks.
Besides the disputed desecration of the dead, there is a
potential impact on the descendents of that person. More
generally, there is a concern for publicizing a medical
diagnosis without consent from the patient and family.
One could argue that these historical celebrities are
immune from privacy protection because their lives are
open to the public. Furthermore because they are long
dead, the subject of any potential harm no longer exists.
Yet, such an argument is still controversial. First, even
though philosophers disagree on how a posthumous
event, such as damaging a person's reputation by libel
and slander, can harm the person when the person to be
harmed does not exist, most philosophers are in agree-
ment that posthumous harm does happen [32,33]. Sec-
ond, even though the record of one's life is open to the
public, it is not clear whether the medical information
extracted from historical evidence that was not known
to the person or family has more weight in the protec-
tion of privacy. For example, certain descendants might
object to the publication of a diagnosis that potentially
tarnishes the reputation of their ancestor. Third, it is
also important to consider the integrity of professional-
ism when publishing potentially private medical infor-
mation. Even if there is no proven harm to the deceased
celebrity and there is no legal violation of privacy, if a
clinician publicizes medical information of a celebrity
with a paparazzi mentality, some would see a potential
of slippery-slope degradation of medical professionalism.
Some might ask, “if this clinician is so nonchalant about
disclosing the privacy of a dead celebrity, can he do the
same thing for me if I die some day?” And lastly, it is
also important to remember that some dead celebrities
have enthusiastic followers (e.g. certain religious figures)
and intense abominators (e.g. certain dictators). It is
ethically considerate to take into account the feelings of
these contemporary people. For all these reasons, there
should be a justifiable scholastic reason that is carefully
balanced against potential ethical concerns before initiat-
ing such a medical evaluation in the absence of the
patient's consent. And such a justification should come
from a broader scholarly context and appropriate multi-
disciplinary peer review. (From this aspect, the rejection
by the Polish government to exhume Chopin’s heart
seems quite appropriate [34]).
There seem to be at least three scholarly purposes for
making a retrospective diagnosis in a historical figure.First it helps understand the influence of a disease on the
works (writing, arts, music etc) and behaviors (personal,
social, and political conducts) of that person. This is most
useful to scholars in the history of art, music, literature,
philosophy, religion, and politics, among others. Second, it
helps understand through his works and recorded behav-
iors how it was like to live with the disease in that histor-
ical time. This is of interest to medical historians and
those who are interested in historical illness narratives.
Third, it can also serve as a precious source to learn the
life-long history of a particular disease through a medically
reconstructed biography. This is of particular interest for
clinicians dealing with certain chronic diseases. There may
be more than these to justify the publication of a retro-
spective diagnosis, but the point here is that it is import-
ant to clarify how such a diagnosis would contribute to
the scholarship of that historical person, or I would call a
broader-context question.
In evidence-based clinical medicine, clinicians in general
are not advised to do any diagnostic workup unless the
result will change the management of the patient. In such
cases, certain specifications of the diagnosis are left
unknown. Earlier, I mentioned an example of the generic
diagnosis of “viral syndrome” in which clinicians do not
initiate the tests for the specification of causative viruses
unless there is a particular purpose. I suggest that the
same principle be applied to retrospective diagnosis. For
example, how does the specification of Chopin’s chronic
respiratory illness to several different diseases, tubercu-
losis, COPD, cystic fibrosis, alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency,
make any significant difference in understanding Chopin’s
artistic accomplishment, music style, music performance,
and Chopin’s biography overall? [3]. In this example, each
diagnosis carries a different etiology but the syndromic
presentation is similar: all present with chronic intermit-
tent respiratory distress with cough and sputum. In such
cases, it is important to clarify how the degree of diagnos-
tic specificity is justified not only by the medical evidence
but also by the scholarship of Chopin. Otherwise, a pure-
ly technical overspecification of retrospective diagnosis
would only alienate non-medical scholars from the entire
practice of retrospective diagnosis.
Lastly, is there any role of retrospective diagnosis with
little or no scholarly implication? Is it appropriate to
speculate a medical diagnosis of a dead celebrity just for
fun? Some say it is an “irresistible,” “eccentric pursuit of
doctors”, “fun escape for doctors” [1] and medical profes-
sionals’ “historical hobby” [4]. Nothing seems to prevent
such activities, but I still maintain that the above men-
tioned caveats be considered when such an account is
published. However, I would also argue that there is a
problem of advising journal editors and reviewers to reject
many of those reports of retrospective diagnosis as critics
suggest [1,3]. If journal editors abide by this advice,
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nosis would fall through the cracks and become orphans
without a forum for scholarly dialogue. The reason is that
the editors of medical journals are not in the position to
evaluate the scholarly impact of such reports in the
humanities and social sciences, whereas the editors of
those non-medical journals can in no way evaluate the
authenticity of medical discussions in such papers. As a
result, they flatly reject those papers following the critics’
advice, and some important papers are not published in
any journals at all. For this reason, it is important that the
soundness of the medical diagnosis be evaluated in the
peer review process of a medical journal, and at the same
time or thereafter, the appropriateness of the historio-
graphical methodology and the scholarly impact of the
diagnosis be evaluated by the peer review process of the
respective non-medical journals. In this regard, it is also
strongly advisable for a clinician to team up with scholars
in the respective field from the beginning of the project.
By doing so, medical and non-medical peer reviews can be
accomplished in parallel.
Toward a truly interdisciplinary retrospective
diagnosis: A case study of Socrates
In this section, I will take stock of what has been
discussed so far, and come up with a list of the key
elements in retrospective diagnosis that can be taken
seriously by scholars of the humanities and social
sciences. This list is by no means intended to claim the
novelty and originality of this essay, and should be taken
as a composite of the current thesis combined with the
caveats that have been published by other scholars. I will
use a case of Socrates’ peculiar symptoms of hearing a
voice and trance-like episodes to demonstrate these points
[35]. The original case report was short and did not have
all the important elements that I discussed above.
Hypothesis-construction
The first point to be considered is what question is to be
answered by the retrospective diagnosis (“broader-context
question”). In order for a retrospective diagnosis to be in-
corporated in the scholarship of the humanities and social
sciences, it is imperative to situate the question in the
middle of an important debate. In case of Socrates, there
has been an ongoing controversy among ancient philoso-
phers and classicists about the nature of Socrates’ “divine
sign”. According to Plato, Socrates had recurrent episodes
of hearing a voice ever since childhood that commanded
him to stop or refrain from certain actions. Socrates said,
“I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridic-
uled in his deposition. This began when I was a child. It is
a voice, and whenever it speaks it turns me away from
something I am about to do, but it never encourages me
to do anything” (Apology 31d — all the quotes from Platohereafter are from [36]). Socrates variously called this
voice “divine sign”, “spiritual sign”, “my prophetic power”,
or in Greek “daimonion”, which visited Socrates unexpect-
edly and abruptly irrespective of the importance of the
context in which he was placed (Apology 31d; 40a
“[daimonion] opposed me, even in small matters ”; Euthy-
demus 272e-273a). The duration of this episode was usu-
ally very brief, probably a few seconds to a minute at
most, and it often came when he was about to initiate an
action or speech, though it was quite unpredictable. The
voice seemed inarticulate; Socrates never attributed any
specific words to the voice. The prevailing theories among
ancient scholars include; 1) a prima facie interpretation
that it was a divine voice and the experience is religious in
nature (e.g. McPharran [37], p191), 2) that Socrates
referred to his own voice of reason (e.g. Nussbaum [38],
p234), and 3) that it was a sort of “hunch” or feeling of
monition (e.g. Vlastos [39]). One of the leading scholars of
Plato, Gregory Vlastos, was quoted as saying that Socrates’
daimonion is “the gravest of the difficulties we all have to
face in our effort to make sense of Socrates” ([40], p206),
as each theory has its serious flaws, and there has been no
consensus. On one hand, some philosopher such as
Bertrand Russell [41] raised a question of Socrates being
“insane” but this was widely dismissed by other scholars.
The attempt to explain Socrates’ behavior outside of his
religion and philosophy has been an anathema for ancient
philosophers and classicists in general. For example, Mark
Joyal [42], referring to such attempts, wrote: “To be sure,
it is in research on the divine sign that some of the low
points in the history of Socratic scholarship have been
plumbed…” Against this backdrop, a clinician can ask: “Is
it still possible that Socrates had a certain neurological
condition and a retrospective diagnosis can shed a differ-
ent light on this debate?” Another possible hypothesis
might be: “Did Socrates attribute his symptoms of seizures
to a god, just as the Hippocratic source informs us that
most laypeople those days attributed seizures in general to
gods and spirits?” [26].
Source of information
As the critics repeatedly admonish [3,15,43,44] the text-
ual source has to be as close as possible to the person of
interest, and should be interpreted in the original
language. This is a basic methodological requirement in
the humanities and social sciences, but it is not easy for
clinicians to fulfill. It is best achieved by collaborating
with scholars of the area of interest. Because Socrates
never wrote anything, all surviving records about his
remarks and behaviors are from Plato, Xenophon, and
Aristophanes, who are all Socrates’ contemporaries and
independently left records. The original Greek texts are
readily available for investigation, and this project is an
interdisciplinary collaboration of a neurologist and a
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nosis is that it is based on the personal observations of
intelligent and observant friends of Socrates’. There are
several other ancient texts mentioning Socrates, but
these were written centuries after his death, and are
believed to be less reliable than the records written by
his direct contacts. Still, caution is in order when we
interpret Plato for the description of Socrates because of
Plato’s own bias and admiration toward Socrates.
Methodology of diagnosis
As discussed in the above Section Epistemic challenges
of retrospective diagnosis, the best methodology that
yields the most plausible retrospective diagnosis is
syndromic; all other methodologies of diagnosis more or
less require laboratory tests and are not suitable for
retrospective diagnosis of historical figures. If a clinic-
ian really wants to specify the diagnosis to the level
of pathological, etiological or laboratory diagnosis as
opposed to syndromic diagnosis, it is more appropriate
and less misleading to add a phrase such as “a clinical
syndrome similar to or consistent with” before the diag-
nosis. In the case of Socrates, the authors arrived at a
syndromic diagnosis of temporal lobe epilepsy based on
four independent clinical features ([35], p653): 1) brief,
reversible, and episodic neurologic symptoms consisting
of involuntary and unexpected hearing of a voice, mostly
associated with action (simple partial seizure); 2) inter-
mittent episodes of diminution or arrest of responsive-
ness and motion with complete recovery except for
various degree of memory loss (complex partial seizure);
3) episodes of prolonged unresponsiveness and arrest of
motion (complex partial status); 4) childhood onset with
relatively benign course into late adulthood. Although
temporal lobe epilepsy carries in its name a localizing
implication of the temporal lobe, temporal lobe epilepsy
as a syndromic diagnosis does not imply that the
localization of pathology is definitive, and it can be used
as a diagnosis without brain imaging studies or electro-
encephalography. The clinical syndrome of temporal
lobe epilepsy can happen as a result of lesions in the
frontal lobe or parietal lobe, and this syndromic diagno-
sis can allow such variations. If, however, the authors
specified the diagnosis as “mesial temporal lobe epilepsy
with hippocampal sclerosis”, which is the most common
type of temporal lobe epilepsy syndrome but requires an
imaging study, it would have been a case of overspecifica-
tion, unless the claim is qualified by the phrase “a clinical
syndrome consistent with …” with justifiable reason.
Ontological consideration
Is there any possibility that the disease being diagnosed did
not exist in the particular historical time? As discussed
above in the Section Ontological challenges of retrospectivediagnosis, this question is fundamentally an empirical
question posed to medical historians and paleopathologists,
but it is probably very difficult to find an answer. At least it
is important to consider the possibility that the disease in
question was caused by a new genetic mutation of the host
or a mutation of pathogens (such as AIDS according to the
current theory) or unique environmental factors (such as
nutritional deprivation) at some point of historical time. In
the case of Socrates, the difference from most other cases
of retrospective diagnosis is that Socrates was not diag-
nosed as ill or abnormal in his time. Therefore, the retro-
spective diagnosis does not raise the most common
question whether Disease X (temporal lobe epilepsy) and
an ancient Disease X′ are the same, but whether Disease X
existed in historical time without being recognized as a
disease. It is well-known that the generalized forms of
epilepsy have existed at least since the time of Hippocrates
[26], but the descriptions of non-convulsive epilepsies, such
as temporal lobe epilepsy and absence epilepsy, are difficult
to come by. However ancient physicians were also remark-
ably astute in describing non-convulsive auras of epileptics
([26], p37). Since most auras are often a partial seizure, or a
small-scale, initial, and non-convulsive phase of larger sei-
zures, and these could stop by themselves without develop-
ing into generalized convulsive seizures, it is logical
to assume that non-convulsive forms of epilepsy also
existed in historical time. In other words, given the fact
that generalized convulsive seizures are just the tip of the
iceberg of many other convulsive and non-convulsive
forms of seizures, the presence of generalized seizure as
the “sacred disease” in ancient times is consistent with the
coexistence of many other forms of milder and non-
convulsive seizures in the background.
Hypothesis-evaluation
As discussed above in the Sections Epistemic challenges
of retrospective diagnosis and Retrospective diagnosis as
theory construction, it is important to evaluate the
hypothesis on the basis of the Bayesian model or the
“explationist” model (more or less plausible or better
explainable) rather than whether it is true or false. This
can be done in two areas: medical and non-medical criti-
cisms. Hypothesis-evaluation from a medical viewpoint
consists mainly in evaluating differential diagnosis. The
main competing differential diagnosis for Socrates would
be schizophrenia with auditory hallucination. It is im-
portant to discuss, for example, the comparison between
temporal lobe epilepsy and schizophrenia in terms of the
nature and content of the voice that Socrates heard,
life-long benign history, age of onset, etc, and which diag-
nosis can explain these features better. In this case one
could argue, for example, that a very brief, non-articulate
stereotyped voice is more consistent with auditory
seizures than schizophrenic auditory hallucinations; that if
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have been almost impossible for him to maintain his phys-
ical and mental health up to age 70, but it would still be
possible if he had a mild case of temporal lobe epilepsy.
Non-medical evaluation is to compare the retrospective
diagnosis with the competing theories presented by
scholars in ancient philosophy, classics, and history. For
example, the discussion can include which theory explains
better the several difficulties of the prima facie interpret-
ation of the voice that have already been presented by So-
cratic scholars, such as the onset in childhood, the
occurrence that is unpredictable and unexplainable to
Socrates, the vagueness of the voice and message, and the
personal nature of “god” who utters the voice. (Socrates
never named the source of the voice, and from every
aspect it was personal to him. That seems to be one of the
reasons that Socrates was charged for “believing in a new
god” and executed.) The proponent of retrospective
diagnosis might also present a new perspective on the
historical Socrates. His bizarre behavior, which is well rec-
ognized by ancient scholars as ‘atopia’ (or strangeness),
along with his intense religiosity (compared to his con-
temporaries, not to our current standards), might be
better explained by a personality and behavioral disorder
associated with temporal lobe epilepsy (this behavioral
disorder is often referred to as Geschwind syndrome).
Socrates might have been an epileptic savant who was
executed because of his eccentric thoughts and behavior
that were at least partially attributable to his neurologic
disorder.
Ethical justification
The final element is the ethical consideration. First of all,
we need to ask whether making a retrospective diagnosis
is justified by its overall goal. We also need to consider
any potential harm to the person of interest and his
descendents and followers. As discussed above, the retro-
spective diagnosis of Socrates was prompted by the schol-
arly debate outside medicine, and it remains to be seen
how the Socratic scholars respond. It is also interesting to
note from Plato’s record of Socrates’ behavior that Socra-
tes himself was not convinced of the origin of the voice.
He was often baffled by unexpected and unexplainable
occurrences of the voice. Particularly when he was ac-
cused of believing in a new deity and condemned to death,
he was clear that he did not create the divine voice, but he
was not at all convinced of its origin. It is quite possible
that he would have welcomed an alternative explanation
of the voice if it had been available. At any rate, there is
no conceivable reason that this diagnosis could have
harmed Socrates, and if anything it would have benefited
him. One can object to such an ethical consideration
because it is a moot point for someone who has been dead
for more than 2400 years, and historians in general haveno qualms about revealing any reality, good or bad or
ugly, of a historical figure. However, I still maintain that if
it is done particularly by a practicing clinician, it is pru-
dent at least to consider this aspect of retrospective diag-
nosis for the sake of professional integrity, as discussed
above in the Section Problems of ethics and professional-
ism in retrospective diagnosis.
The relevance to the ongoing debate among
historians and paleopathologists
So far I have focused my discussion on retrospective diag-
nosis of an individual historical person by means of biog-
raphies and other sources for clinical diagnosis. As stated
in the Introduction, however, the concept of retrospective
diagnosis used for the diagnosis of an individual person
from a life-long history has a subtle but significant differ-
ence from that used by medical historians and paleopa-
thologists. In this section, I will briefly go over the debate
among them and how it relates to the current proposal for
a diagnosis of an individual. While this author, who is
neither a historian nor paleopathologist, has no qualifica-
tion to jump into this debate, it is only fair to explain the
relevance of this essay to their debate since I have exten-
sively quoted their works and arguments, and incorpo-
rated many of them into my discussion.
As already discussed in the Section Ontological chal-
lenges of retrospective diagnosis, medical historians and
paleopathologists are struggling among themselves with
a similar challenge of identifying historical diseases with-
out relying on anachronistic methodology in modern
academic discourse. This debate is commonly called
among those historians as the “Cunningham debate”
[15,20]. On one hand, there are historians who deny the
possibility of retrospective diagnosis altogether, such as
Wilson [19] and Cunningham [20], because medical
diagnosis is essentially a social construction of the time
and place in history, which cannot be transferred to a
different historical time. On the other hand, there are
those who accept the thesis that historical diagnoses are
a social construction [43] or “social diagnosis” [44], but
do not deny the possibility of retrospective diagnosis
altogether, insofar as the investigators take necessary
steps to avoid anachronistic pitfalls when interpreting
historical sources. They also advocate, as I do in this
paper, a team project among medical professionals and
historians. Karenberg ( [3] see also endnotea), similar to
Mitchell [44], also advocates cautious approaches to
historical material without ruling out the possibility of
retrospective diagnosis altogether, though he does not
advocate the team approach.
How does my current approach, then, relate to this
debate? As I already stated in the Section Epistemic
challenges of retrospective diagnosis, I fully agree with
Wilson [19], Cunningham [20], and Arrizabalaga [43]
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tally a social construction, and a disease or a disease
concept does not exist independently from the act of diag-
nosing in a particular historical time and place. In this
sense, I respectfully disagree with Mitchell [44], who con-
trasts between historical diagnosis as “social diagnosis” on
one hand, and contemporary diagnosis as “biological diag-
nosis” on the other. With Cunningham, and against
Mitchell, I would submit that every diagnosis, whether
historical or contemporary, including those diagnoses
using modern bioscientific technologies, which Mitchell is
ready to classify as “biological diagnosis”, is still a social
construction. It is true that, generally speaking, modern
diagnoses rely much more on biology than social factors,
but the difference is a matter of degree, not of kinds. But
more importantly, no matter how much or how little
“biology” is involved in diagnosis, all diagnostic categories
are man-made constructions, as I stated in great detail in
the section Epistemic challenges of retrospective diagno-
sis. In other words, all the diagnoses, modern or historical,
biological or non-biological, are constructed by physicians
who are acting in the midst of their society with all the in-
fluences from their social environment, including religion,
culture, science, and technologies. (See endnoteb for an
example). And their diagnoses are constructed to suit the
needs of the patient, family, and society by informing,
explaining, theorizing, treating, and prognosticating what
happened to the sick patient. Identifying disease is only
one component of this social practice, and may not be re-
quired in many cases. The act of diagnosis always has its
social purposes and implications, whether ancient or mod-
ern. This is what I meant by saying that all the diagnoses
are fundamentally a social practice and social construc-
tion, and I suspect that this is what Cunningham meant
when he wrote “turning away from diseases … and also
away from disease concepts … and turning it instead
toward how diagnosis happens” ([20], p16, emphasis
original), and “you die of what your doctor says you die of”
(ibid, p17, emphasis original).
At any rate, Cunningham then argues, correctly I
think, that it is impossible to translate a historical diag-
nosis into disease identification in contemporary terms.
Where I disagree with Cunningham, and agree with
Mitchell and others, is that retrospective diagnosis is still
possible. But the reason is totally different from Mitchell,
Karenberg and others. I disagree with Cunningham
regarding his thesis that retrospective diagnosis is
impossible exactly because I fully endorse the other part
of his thesis that all medical diagnoses are essentially a
social construction. It seems paradoxical, but the key to
understanding this claim is my thesis that, as I argued in
the Section Epistemic challenges of retrospective diagnosis
in great length, a clinical diagnosis as a social construction
is an explanatory device and a theory construction thatserve many purposes in society. It can serve not only
the patient and her family to receive the explanation of
what is going on in her, but also serve as an explanation of
what happened to a deceased patient. While I agree with
Cunningham that we cannot directly transfer a historical
disease concept to a contemporary disease identification, I
am arguing, against Cunningham, that we can still use our
contemporary diagnosis as a modern explanatory device
and theory construction, to explain what happened to a
historical individual in question, just as historians and
archeologists are all using state-of-the-art technology and
concepts to explain what happened in the historical world.
To insist that physicians must use ancient concepts and
tools to diagnose an ancient patient is as illogical as to in-
sist that archeologists must use ancient tools and concepts
to investigate their archeological sites and materials. (See
also [13] p698, “… it is vital that diagnostic criteria have a
secure basis which derives ultimately from clinical medi-
cine”. Here I am talking about the tools and concepts of
clinical diagnosis and archeological investigation, not the
concepts used to interpret historical documents, which of
course requires ancient or historicized concepts).
By situating my current thesis in the midst of the
Cunningham debate among historians, it seems clear to
me that my disagreement with Cunningham derives
from the subtle but critically important difference
between retrospective diagnosis as disease identification
in historical time, or the retrospective construction of
historical nosology, which is the primary concern for his-
torians and paleopathologists such as Cunningham, and
retrospective clinical diagnosis of a deceased individual,
or retrospective diagnosis as the construction of a med-
ical theory to explain what happened to a historical indi-
vidual, which is the primary concern for those clinicians
interested in retrospective diagnosis. As I have discussed
in great detail, neglecting this subtle but critical differ-
ence and conflating disease identification, or nosology,
and the social act of clinical diagnosis have resulted in
harsh criticism against the retrospective diagnosis of his-
torical individuals. At the same time, in order to avoid
this confusion I have proposed in this essay that such a
retrospective diagnosis should be limited to syndromic
diagnosis without identifying disease unless there is justi-
fiable reason for such specification.
Conclusion
While professional historians and paleopathologists have
their own debate and agenda regarding retrospective diag-
nosis as reviewed in the preceding section, I have focused
this essay on only one type of retrospective diagnosis, that
of famous historical individuals. Presently, this type of
retrospective diagnosis in academic publications receives
two polarized evaluations [1]: In one camp, it is dealt with
as a hobby of historically minded clinicians who enjoy
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uncovering intriguing medical secrets. These reports
usually belong to an accessory section for incidental topics
or letters to the editor in medical journals. In the other
camp, serious scholars of the humanities and social sci-
ences have little interest in those highly specific diagnostic
labels generated by clinicians whose methodologies and
wild speculations have little justification. Some of these
harsh critics that I have argued against are pessimistic
about the possibility of retrospective diagnosis altogether,
as long as it uses the modern concept of medical diagno-
sis. One of the aims of this essay has been to narrow the
gap between these two camps and try to elevate the status
of retrospective diagnosis of famous historical figures in a
truly interdisciplinary arena.
But in the end, the distance between me and the critics
of retrospective diagnosis turns out to be much narrower
than it would seem; we both agree that retrospective
diagnosis has to base on historicized interpretation, and
the proper methodologies of historiography should be
followed. We also agree that more attention should be
given to ethics and professionalism of publishing retro-
spective diagnosis. Where I disagree with the critics is
their argument that retrospective diagnosis as historicized
knowledge is impossible because the modern scientific
verification of historicized diagnosis is simply illogical or
akin to oxymoron. I have replied to the critics that their
pessimistic skepticism and obsession with the scientific
verification of diagnosis is based on their conflation of the
act of categorizing diseases in a system of nosology, or
disease identification, and the social act of diagnosing a
patient from her history, or the construction of a medical
theory. Instead of advising journal editors to stop publish-
ing reports of retrospective diagnosis, they should collab-
orate with those interested medical specialists, exchange
ideas and develop a truly interdisciplinary field of retro-
spective diagnosis. At the same time, I have emphasized
the importance of those “hobbyist” clinicians to reach out
to non-medical scholars of the relevant field by situating
the retrospective diagnosis in a larger theoretical frame-
work instead of toying with their diagnostic acumen. Such
a collaboration has already been proposed by some of the
cautious proponents of retrospective diagnosis in the
history of medicine and paleopathology [43,44]. My hope
is that this essay can pave such a collaborative path in the
field of retrospective diagnosis of famous historical figures.
Endnotes
aIn all fairness, Karenberg [3] does not deny the possi-
bility of retrospective diagnosis altogether; he rejects
only those approaches exemplified below, which he calls
“naive retrospective diagnosis”. Yet it is unclear how the
editors and reviewers of medical journals or any journals
outside history and related fields, who are not historians,can identify which report is “naive” and hence to be
rejected. They could rather interpret Karenberg’s advice
simply as an indication that all the papers dealing with
retrospective diagnosis are illegitimate.
bAs I quoted in the Section Ontological challenges of
retrospective diagnosis, Karenberg’s work [3] on the
diagnoses proposed for Chopin’s conditions clearly dem-
onstrates that the diagnostic concepts change in parallel
with the advancement of modern biomedical science. In
other words, contemporary physicians are bound to use
diagnostic concepts and tools that are produced by the
contemporary culture of modern biotechnology, just as
ancient physicians are bound to use diagnostic concepts
and tools that are produced by the ancient culture of sci-
ences and religious beliefs in their society. It is not that one
diagnosis is social and another is biological, but they are all
socially determined. Chopin’s example which Karenberg
beautifully demonstrated, even though for a different pur-
pose, clearly attests to this relationship.
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